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Congress enacted The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ove rt h ep r o t e s t so f
small business advocates who claimed that the ADA would trigger a wave of bankrupt-
cies. Although the proﬁtability of ﬁrms may suffer from the costs of ADA compliance,
no systematic review of the evidence has been done. This paper seeks to determine if the
ADA had a measurable impact on both the entry of new ﬁrms and the failure rate (exit) of
existing ﬁrms.
The empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that the ADA negatively im-
pacted the retail industry. There were fewer retail ﬁrms after the ADA was passed, and
the drop was larger in states in which the ADA was more of a legal innovation, and in
states that had more disabled people, more ADA-related lawsuits, and more ADA-related
labor complaints. There is also evidence that employment and access discrimination suits
imposed real costs on retail stores, encouraging exit. However, the exit of incumbents was
partially offset by new entry. Overall, the number of food stores decreased 2–13% after the
ADA came into effect, and at least a 1.4–2.3% decrease in the number of smaller stores
may be attributed directly to the ADA, net of trends affecting larger ﬁrms.
Two subsidiary contributions of the paper are an inquiry into the response of industry
dynamics to increases in costs, and an econometric model to back out entry and exit rates
from establishment count data. The theoretical model of industry dynamics shows that
increases in marginal and ﬁx e dc o s t sm a yh a v ei n t e r e s t i n ga n dn o n - o b v i o u se f f e c t so ne n t r y
and exit. The econometric model enables maximum likelihood estimation of unobserved
entry and exit processes based on the observed establishment count data. Both models
show promise for application to other questions in economics.1




The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 is the most recent major federal an-
tidiscrimination law. The ADA seeks to prevent employment and wage discrimination
against disabled workers, and to ensure the physical accessibility of businesses to disabled
customers. Congress enacted the ADA over the protests of small business advocates who
claimed that the ADA would trigger a wave of bankruptcies. Despite allegations, no sys-
tematic review of the evidence has been presented to substantiate or refute this claim. The
proﬁtability of smaller ﬁrms may be vulnerable to the cost of complying with the ADA.
Compliance costs stem from provisions mandating accommodation of disabled workers
and customers, and from the civil lawsuits and penalties to which the ADA exposes ﬁrms.
In this paper we seek to determine if the ADA had a measurable impact on the number
of ﬁrms, the entry of new ﬁrms, and the failure rates of existing ﬁrms in the retail sector.
We focus on retailers because they are subject to both the employment and customer acces-
sibility provisions of the ADA. The empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that
the ADA indeed decreased the number of retail ﬁrms. There were fewer retail ﬁrms after
t h eA D Aw a sp a s s e d ,a n dt h ed r o pw a sl a r g e ri ns t a t e si nw h i c ht h eA D Aw a sm o r eo fa
legal innovation, and in states that had more disabled people, more ADA-related lawsuits,
and more ADA-related labor complaints. The same conclusions hold when baseline trends
for larger establishments, which are least vulnerable to the costs imposed by the ADA, are
differenced out. There is also evidence that employment and access discrimination suits2
imposed real costs on retail stores, encouraging exit. However, the exit of incumbents was
partially offset by new entrants, which may imply that stores less able to adapt to the new
requirements made room for the entry of stores better able to adapt. So, while the predic-
tion by the pessimists that the ADA would cause ﬁrms to fail may be correct, the decline in
the number of ﬁrms was partially offset by new entry. Overall, the ADA is associated with
1.4 to 2.3% fewer small and medium ﬁrms, net of trends affecting large ﬁrms.
The investigation also makes two subsidiary contributions. The ﬁrst is an inquiry into
the response of industry dynamics to increases in costs. In the theoretical model developed
in section 4, we show that increases in marginal and ﬁx e dc o s t sm a yh a v ei n t e r e s t i n ga n d
non-obvious effects on entry and exit. Before costs change, the model exhibits behavior
that matches the retail sector examined here: fewer but larger ﬁrms over time and signiﬁ-
cant entry and exit. When costs rise, the market quantity supplied falls, but the number of
ﬁrms may rise or fall due to composition effects as the size distribution of ﬁrms changes.
In addition, no matter how the number of ﬁrms changes, entry and exit of ﬁrms may each
increase or decrease. The potential outcomes from a cost increase are the competitor neu-
tral case, in which entry decreases and exit increases, the entrant favoring case, in which
entry and exit both increase, and the incumbent favoring case, in which entry and exit both
decrease. The model places restrictions on which outcomes are possible given which costs
rise (marginal or ﬁxed). The entrant favoring case can arise only from an increase in mar-
ginal cost (when demand is inelastic), which favors small entering ﬁrms relative to larger
incumbents. The incumbent favoring case can come about only from an increase in ﬁxed
cost, which favors incumbents with their larger market share relative to small entrants.
These restrictions allow us to infer the nature of the cost increases caused by the various
components of the ADA. The same model could easily be adapted to examine the impacts3
of other forms of cost-increasing regulation or exogenous process innovation on industry
dynamics.
The second subsidiary contribution of the paper is an econometric model that allows
entry and exit rates to be estimated from counts of currently operating ﬁrms. Given that
the impacts of the ADA on ﬁrms may be subtle, a large data set is required to assess the
evidence with any degree of precision. The data used in the study are the comprehensive
Census Bureau counts of business establishments by county and type of business. Thus,
t h ed a t aa r ec o u n t so ft h en u m b e ro fb u s i n e s s es currently operating in a year, and do not
directly give entry and exit rates. There is no publicly available data set as disaggregated
and as large that gives direct information on entry and exit.1 While standard models for
count data can be used to investigate changes in the number of ﬁrms in the market, back-
ing out the entry and exit rates from the establishment count data is the major econometric
contribution of the paper. Borrowing techniques from queuing theory, we develop the max-
imum likelihood estimator for a latent entry and exit model based on the available count
data. The model incorporates unobserved heterogeneity in and correlation between the
entry and exit rates. Identiﬁcation of the entry and exit rates is secured through the as-
sumption that entry and exit are Poisson stochastic processes, conditional on time-varying
covariates and correlated, gamma-distributed mixing terms (i.e., random effects that relax
the Markovian assumptions in the model). Although we use techniques drawn from the
existing queuing theory literature, the likelihood for the count data is non-trivial to derive
a n dw eh a v en o ts e e nt h el i k e l i h o o df o rt h i sm odel presented elsewhere. We denote the
model a CMt/CMt/∞ queuing system, for reasons explained in section 5. We develop
1Other researchers have exploited the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) from the U.S. Census
Bureau to study entry and exit. The LRD, however, covers only the manufacturing sector, which is not likely
to be affected by Title III of the ADA, as explained below. The new Longitudinal Business Database,a l s o
from Census, covers the retail sector and is a promising resource; it was not yet available when the present
study was begun and is still not publicly available.4
theCMt/CMt/∞model here outofnecessity, due to theparticular limitationsofthe avail-
able data; however, there are many other potential applications for the econometric model.
We return to these possibilities in the ﬁnal section of the paper.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we discuss the costs that the
ADA creates for ﬁrms. Section 3 reviews the relevant literature. Section 4 introduces the
theoretical model of ﬁrm dynamics and response to the ADA. In Section 5, we formalize
the CMt/CMt/∞ econometric model and present the likelihood of the data. Section 6
discusses empirical strategies to identify impacts of the ADA on the number, entry, and exit
of retail ﬁrms, and includes the results of the estimations. A ﬁnal section concludes and
discusses the broader applicability of the theoretical and econometric models in the paper.
Proofs and the detailed derivation of the CMt/CMt/∞ likelihood are in an appendix.
2 The Costs of the ADA for Firms
T h eA D Aw a sp a s s e di nJ u l y1 9 9 0 .M o s tl i k e l yt oa f f e c tp r i v a t eﬁrms are Title I, which
prohibits discrimination by employers against disabled individuals, and Title III, which
(among other things) bans discrimination in access to private commercial facilities. Title I
protects disabled individuals who can perform the “essential functions” of a position, both
in applying for a job and once on payroll. The employer is not allowed to discriminate
against disabled workers in hiring, ﬁring, or wages. The employer is required to make
“reasonable accommodations” for disabled workers, as long as accommodation does not
create “undue hardship” (which is not deﬁned) for the employer. The employment provi-
s i o n st o o ke f f e c tJ u l y1 9 9 2f o re m p l o y e r sw i t h 25 or more employees, and two years later
for businesses with 15-24 employees. Smaller ﬁrms remain exempt.
Title III of the ADA requires businesses to make accessible all are a so fs t o r e sw h e r e5
customers might go. In addition, it instituted a national building code for accessibility for
new construction. Accessibility-related costs are limited to 20% of total construction or
remodeling costs. Title III took effect January 26, 1992 for businesses with more than 25
employees, six months later for ﬁrms with 11-25 employees, and one year later for smaller
ﬁrms.2
What then are the costs of the ADA to ﬁrms?3 The non-discrimination clause means
that employers cannot base hiring, ﬁring, and wage decision solely on the marginal product
of the individual worker, which may lead to higher operating costs. Other costs stem from
real or perceived violation of the law. Enforcement of Title I is delegated to the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Fr o mJ u l y1 9 9 2t oS e p t e mber 2001, 158,280
discriminationchargeswereﬁledwiththeEEOC.4 When a worker ﬁles acharge, theEEOC
investigates, attempts to settle, and in some cases sues the ﬁrm (or gives permission to the
worker to privately sue the ﬁrm). Of the 11% of charges leading to non-litigated compen-
sation, the average beneﬁt paid to the worker was $19,226.5 If the case is litigated and the
plaintiff prevails, the ADA requires ﬁr m st op a yr e m e d i e s ,s u c ha sb a c kp a ya n da l lc o u r t
costs.6 A related law, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, also makes the ﬁrm liable for damages
ranging from $50,000 to $300,000.7 Thus costs come from three sources. The ﬁrst two
are the direct accommodation costs for disabled workers8 and the litigation, remedy, and
2In addition to the employee count, the businesses with 11-25 employees also had to have gross receipts
of less than $1,000,000, and the businesses with 0-10 employees had to have gross receipts of less than
$500,000.
3This section draws on the similar discussion in Acemoglu and Angrist (2001).
4T h e s ed a t aa r ef r o mt h eE E O C ,a v a i l a b l ef r o m<http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-charges.html>.
5Ibid.
6Court costs in employment practices suits average $50,000 to $100,000 per claimant (Dertouzos, 1988;
Chanzit, 2001).
7Compensatory damages averaged $395,197 in the 101 successful suits for wrongful termination due
to discrimination (of which ADA suits are a subset) in California during 1992-1996.(Jung, 1997) Plaintiffs
prevailed (through verdict or settlement) in about 38.1% of such cases. Punitive damages averaged another
$895,863 in the 25 cases with punitive damage awards. These ﬁgures do not include out-of-court settlements.
8There are no good estimates of the magnitude of accommodation costs. A non-random survey cited in6
penalty costs. The third is the cost of a new kind of insurance that has arisen in response to
such lawsuits. In the past decade, more ﬁrms have begun to purchase Employment Practice
Liability Insurance (EPLI), with basic premiums ranging from $5,000 to $20,000 per year.
The costs of Title III stem from similar sources. One estimate places access accom-
modation costs at $500–$3000 on average (Chebium, 2000).9 Enforcement of Title III is
up to the Justice Department; civil penalties can be as high as $100,000 per violation, and
remedies such as repayment of court costs and construction costs can make losing a Title
III case even more expensive for a ﬁrm.10
These actual and expected costs prompted small business advocates to lobby hard
against the ADA, claiming that it would trigger a wave of bankruptcies (Teltsch, 1993).
While no such wave of bankruptcies has been reported in the press, there certainly have
been thousands of lawsuits, and the law may have had subtle effects on the decisions of
ﬁrms to enter or exit markets. For example, if there are differences in the organizational
adaptability of ﬁrms, then the changed legal environment may have induced the exit of
those ﬁrms that found it costliest to adapt, making room for the entry of new ﬁrms that
ﬁnd it less costly to adapt. The evidence presented in section 6 shows there was indeed
increased exit and entry in response to the ADA. In this case, changes in the number of
ﬁrms in a market may mask larger structural changes caused by an increased turnover rate
of ﬁrms during the period of adaptation and transition. This example highlights why entry
and exit rates are interesting in their own right, instead of looking only at the number of
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) ﬁnds average costs of $930 per accommodation through 1997, but this ﬁgure
does not include involuntary accommodations, the value of time spent on compliance, or reduced efﬁciency
of the ﬁrm due to compliance.
9The estimate is from the National Federation of Independent Businesses. The most common accommo-
dation is ensuring wheelchair access.
10It is difﬁcult to estimate the number of lawsuits ﬁled under Title III. The DOJ ﬁles suit itself relatively
rarely and only for high-proﬁle cases; the DOJ does not track private suits. In section 6 I use a measure of
Title III suits brought to judgment in the federal court system.7
ﬁrms in the market.
3 Relevant Literature
Three strands of literature come together in this paper: empirical studies evaluating the ef-
fects of the ADA, the industrial organization literature onﬁrm entry and industry dynamics,
and applications of queuing theory in economics.
Empirical studies of the ADA all focus on the employment of disabled individuals.
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) ﬁn dt h a tt h eA D Aa p p e a r st oh a v er e d u c e dt h ee m p l o y -
ment of disabled men of all ages and of women under age 40. More recently, Jolls (2004)
presents evidence suggesting that disemployment of the disabled is partially explained by
their increased educational participation. In this argument, the disabled believe that better
employment opportunities for them under the ADA increased the returns to human capi-
tal investment, and choose further education in the short run instead of joining the labor
force.11 This paper extends the empirical literature on the ADA to the impacts on the ﬁrm’s
proﬁtability and industry dynamics.
There are numerous empirical studies in industrial organization examining the entry
or exit of ﬁrms.12 A few empirical regularities emerge from the many studies based on
reduced-form models (see Geroski (1995) for a review). First, within an industry, high
entry rates are correlated with low exit rates (Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson, 1988). This
ﬁts the usual intuition that when conditions are proﬁtable in a market, not only are new
11See also Jolls and Prescott (2004), and Jolls (2004) for citations to the other empirical papers examining
the employment effects of the ADA.
12There is also a large related literature in the ﬁelds of corporate demography and organizational ecology.
See Carroll and Hannan (2000) for an overview. Of this literature, the closest application to the present study
(although using different methodology) is Barnett and Carroll’s (1993) examination of early telecommunica-
tions regulation on the number of ﬁrms within size categories.8
entrants attracted to the market but existing ﬁrms are unlikely to exit. Second, there are
large cross-sectional variations in the entry and exit rates of industries (Dunne et al., 1988;
Geroski, 1995). Third, across industries in the cross section, high entry rates are correlated
with high exit rates (Dunne et al., 1988; Honjo, 2000). Fourth, the hazard rates (exit rates)
estimated from panel data typically decline with the age and the size of ﬁrm (Hall, 1987;
Evans, 1987).13 In the age dimension, therefore, there is negative duration dependence.14
We view these four stylized facts as necessary possible outcomes for any econometric
model; the CMt/CMt/∞ model we develop can accommodate them all. All of these
studies use longitudinal data on individual ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector. Shonkwiler
and Harris (1993) and Geroski and Mazzucato (2001) are two of the few studies that model
the number of ﬁrms in the industry directly, in a dynamic setting. Unlike the present work,
they do not attempt to back out the entry and exit rates from the data. There are also
an increasing number of empirical studies of entry and exit using structural econometric
models, mostly in static or two-period settings (Bresnahan and Reiss, 1987; Berry, 1992;
Mazzeo, 2002; Seim, 2004), although Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2004) present a fully
dynamic model. We do not adopt a structural model based on optimizing entry and exit
behavior for the empirical work, because positing simpler reduced forms for the entry and
exit rates allow us to estimate these rates from panel data on the count of establishments
in each market. In contrast, Pakes et al.’s (2004) model requires observations on entry and
e x i t ,a n dt h es t a t i cm o d e l sf o c u so nestimating parameters of the proﬁt function and not
entry and exit rates themselves.
There are several theoretical studies of industry dynamics. Three prominent models
13It is well known that estimated negative duration dependence may be a spurious result of estimating a
common hazard rate for ﬁrms that actually have constant but differing rates. I account for this explicitly in
my econometric model.
14A notable exception is Holmes and Schmitz (1995), who ﬁnd that the hazard rate may be ∪-shaped for
small ﬁrms run by their founders.9
withatomisticﬁrms are Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992), and Klepper (1996); Ericson
and Pakes (1995) extend the literature to imperfect competition. The model in section 4
is based on Klepper (1996),15 which is a more convenient model to work with than the
complex dynamical system in Jovanovic (1982) and admits non-steady state analysis more
easily than do the models in Hopenhayn (1992) and Ericson and Pakes (1995). By ignoring
the strategic interactions among ﬁrms built into Ericson and Pakes’s (1995) model, we are
able to characterize how entry and exit change in response to structural cost changes. We
do not consider our model’s price-taking assumption as signiﬁcantly detrimental in our
application to the retail sector, with its great preponderance of small establishments in
the period we study.16 However, our model would be less suited to study of industries
with few ﬁrms such as telecommunications or automobile manufacturing.O u rt h e o r e t i c a l
model simpliﬁes Klepper(1996)byabstracting away frominnovation(whichmaynot be as
important in our retailing context as in Klepper’s (1996) manufacturing setting) and adds
a microstructure for costs for the sake of exploring the various channels through which
the ADA might increase ﬁrms’ costs. Hopenhayn (1992) is the only one of these studies
that investigates the effect of cost changes on entry and exit, and focuses on the limiting
distribution instead of the short-run impact we consider.
The econometric model developed in section 5 is based on queuing theory. There are
many applications of queuing theory in economic literature, but empirical applications
(e.g., De Vany and Frey (1982); Daniel (1995); Prieger (2001; 2002a; 2002b)) are scarcer
than theoretical studies. None of these empirical queuing studies attempts to infer arrivals
and departures from the number of units currently in the system, as we do here.
15See also Klepper (2002).
16There is, however, some evidence that supermarkets erect strategic barriers to entry in the grocery store
subcategory of food stores, the main category we explore (Cotterill and Haller, 1992). Extending our model
to incorporate strategic action awaits future research.10
4 The Theoretical Model
In a companion paper (Prieger, 2004a), we construct a general model to investigate the
response of industry dynamics to increases in co s t s .F o rt h es a k eo fb r e v i t y ,h e r ew ew i l l
only describe the impacts that the ADA is ass u m e dt oh a v eo nc o s t sa n dt h em a i nr e s u l t s
from the theoretical model; additional details of the model and proofs are presented in
Prieger (2004a). The model draws on elements of Klepper (1996) for industry dynamics
and Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) for the ADA-speciﬁc components.
In each period t =1 ,2,..., there is a continuum of atomistic potential entrant ﬁrms
indexed by their ﬁxed cost F, which is uniformly distributed on [F, ¯ F] ≡ F,0 <F<
¯ F,w i t ht o t a lm a s sM.T h e ﬁx e dc o s t sa r ep a i de a c hp e r i o d ,a n da r ea v o i d a b l ei faﬁrm
decides to exit (or not enter) the market.17 Firms have no costs if they do not enter: outside
opportunities are normalized to zero. The variable inputs of a ﬁrm are capital K,w i t h
price r, and workers. Workers are either disabled (D,w i t hw a g ewD), or not (L,w i t h
wage wL). The production technology of each ﬁrm is identical, and is described by the
constant returns to scale production function q = G(L,D,K)=γ(L+eD)αK1−α, γ>0,
α ∈ (0,1),w h e r ee ∈ (0,1) is the relative efﬁciency of disabled workers. Note that
disabled and nondisabled workers are perfect substitutes at rate e nondisabled workers for
one disabled worker.
Each unit of disabled labor requires an accommodation cost a>0; assume that e
would be zero in the absence of accommodation of disabled workers. It is assumed that
both disabled and nondisabled workers are active in the labor force, which in a competitive
labor market requires that wD = ewL − a.18 The substitutability of labor implies that
17The ﬁxed costs may represent the costs of business licenses, complying with local regulations, or lumpy
investments that fully depreciate each period.
18In contrast, Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) do not assume that both types of workers are active but instead11
ﬁrms are indifferent between disabled and nondisabled workers at those wages. Labor
supply of both types is assumed to be completely elastic at the given wages. Under these
assumptions, the marginal cost of production is constant at βwα
L,w h e r eβ is a function of
(α,γ,r).19
After the passage of the ADA, costs change for several reasons. First, the equal-pay
provision of the ADA mandates that wD rise to wL.20 It is assumed that to minimize the
risk of lawsuits, labor employed by each ﬁrm is now composed of D and L in the same
proportion as in the labor force at large. Let x be the fraction of workers that are disabled
in the labor force. Second, under the ADA ﬁr m st h a th a v ee n t e r e dt h em a r k e ta r ee x p o s e d
to potential litigation costs. Litigation is of two types: employment discrimination suits, as
authorized under Title I of the ADA, and accessibility suits, as authorized under Title III.
Employment suits may stem from (perceived) hiring discrimination and wrongful ter-
minationof disabledworkers. Assumethatﬁrms layoffandreplace fractionθ oftheir work
force each period,21 that the size of the pool of potential hires is H, and that each worker
composing H applies for only one of the positions open in the current period at each ﬁrm,
and that H is large compared to any one ﬁrm’s labor demand. A disabled applicant that
is not hired for a position sues with probability  H;t h eﬁrm (assumed to be risk neutral)
has expected costs of AH from each suit, inclusive of litigation, settlement, and damages
awarded. Then the expected cost from hiring discrimination suits is xH HAH ≡ ΛH.A
disabled worker that is ﬁred sues with probability  T and expected cost AT. The expected
termination costs are therefore θD TAT ≡ ΛTD. This formulation implies that hiring suits
derive it as a result of their model.
19In particular, β ≡ (δ
1−α + δ
−α)r1−α/γ,w h e r eδ ≡ α/(1 − α).
20In a general equilibrium model, wL would fall because (as will be shown) output and labor demanded
drop. In this partial equilibrium setup, the elastic supply of labor ensures that wL does not change.
21Turnover may be prompted by workers receiving random shocks with probability θ that cause their
productivity with their current employer to fall to zero, as in Acemoglu and Angrist (2001).12
raise ﬁxed costs and that termination suits raise marginal costs.22
Accessibility suits may also raise both ﬁxed and variable costs. The expected number
of accessibility suits is sF(y)+sV(y)q,w h e r ey is the fraction of the population that is
disabled; sF and sV are assumed to increase with y.H e r esF may represent the suits ﬁled
by activists or otherwise occurring without respect to the size of the ﬁrm.23 The term sVq
represents suits ﬁled by customers, and is therefore assumed to be proportional to output.
The expected cost of each Title III suit to the ﬁrm is AIII. Letting ΛF ≡ sFAIII and
ΛV ≡ sVAIII, the total expected cost of accessibility suits is ΛF + qΛV.





wL +( a + ΛT)x




q + F + ΛH + ΛF (1)
≡ c(x,ΛT,ΛV)q + φ(ΛH + ΛF)+F (2)
where the other arguments of marginal cost c are suppressed. With this notation, pre-ADA
costs are marginal cost c(0,0,0) and ﬁxed cost φ(0) + F. Equation (1) is derived in the
appendix.
Entry, production, and exit in the model are similar to the model of Klepper (1996),
and are described only in broad outlines here. Consumers view ﬁrms’ products as homo-
geneous. Market demand is a function of the current market price only, and increases (for
given p)o v e rt i m e . I faﬁrm stays in the market it keeps all previous customers and at-
t r a c t sas h a r eo fn e wb u y e r s( a n dt h o s ew h o s ep revious supplier exited) in proportion to
22That hiring suit costs are not related to output stems from the assumption that each searcher applies for
one job at each hiring ﬁrm, so that the number of applicants at each ﬁrm is the same. While such a sharp
distinction between hiring and ﬁring suits may be unrealistic, the only assumption needed for the empirical
work is that a ﬁrm receives a certain number of job applications whatever its output level.
23There are numerous cases reported in the press of litigants actively seeking out ﬁrms to sue under the
ADA. A Florida lawyer has sued over 740 businesses, mostly on behalf of a single disabled activist group
(Voris, 2001). Two individuals in California have ﬁled 1,500 ADA suits between them (Krasnowski, 2004).
Such litigants appear to be “equal opportunity suers”, ﬁling against ﬁrms of all sizes.13
last period’s market share. The ﬁrm can also sell more product by incurring a marketing
cost.
Since ﬁrms are atomistic, they are assumed to be price takers. Firms can project the
current period’s market-clearing price, but are myopic in that they base entry, exit, and
production decisions only on current period’s proﬁts, and do not anticipate the passage of
the ADA before it happens. Given an expectation of the market-clearing price, each ﬁrm
decides by how much to expand output should the ﬁrm decide to be in the market. Firms
will enter (or stay in the market) if their optimized proﬁt is positive, and will not enter
(or will exit) if it is negative. This behavior creates a threshold value F k
t for ﬁxed costs
(differing for period t each cohort that entered at k ≤ t) that characterizes the marginal
entrant (or exiting ﬁrm), which deﬁnes the measure of ﬁrms in the market. The equilibrium
price is determined by supply equaling demand under the optimal entry, exit, and output
expansion decisions.
In equilibrium in the model, in the absence of the ADA, market price declines and the
market quantity increases over time in equilibrium, and therefore the quantity for any ﬁrm
staying in the market increases over time. Exit occurs each period, but entry eventually
ceases. The number of ﬁrms in the market may increase at ﬁrst, but eventually declines
monotonically.24 The model thus exhibits behavior that matches many of the retail sub-
sectors during the relevant time period: fewer but larger ﬁrms over time,25 with signiﬁcant
entry and exit.26
Against this backdrop we can now examine the impact of the ADA. In the period the
24See Proposition 1 of Prieger (2004a) for a formal statement of these results.
25In SIC 54, food stores, the main subsector examined in the empirical work, the average number of ﬁrms
was 59.2 in 1988, rose to 61.4 in 1992, and then fell to 56.9 by 1997. The percentage of ﬁrms with fewer
than 20 employees fell from 82.4% in 1988 to 80.0% in 1997.
26For example, from 1995 to 1996 there was an 11.1% birth rate and 10.5% death rate in the retail sector
(source: Statistics of U.S. Businesses, Census Bureau).14
ADA comes into effect, it is assumed that the ﬁrms know that costs have changed before
they make their entry, exit, and output decisions.
Proposition 1 (Impact of Cost Increases) In the period in which cost increases, the fol-
lowing hold, compared to the same period were cost not to increase:
1. Equilibrium price rises and equilibrium market quantity falls.
2. The number of entering ﬁrms can increase or decrease.
3. The number of incumbent ﬁrms can increase or decrease.
The ﬁrst point follows naturally from the fact that while cost rises for all ﬁrms, the
demand function is unchanged. The second and third results may be shown numerically.
In these statements “number of ﬁrms” is to be read as mass of ﬁrms, which is (Ft
t −
F)M/( ¯ F − F) for entrants and
Pt−1
k=1(Fk
t − F)M/( ¯ F − F) for incumbents. Given that
marketquantityfalls, when the numberofﬁrmsincreasesitmust bethateachﬁrmproduces
less or smaller entrants replace larger incumbents (a composition effect), or both. In static
entry models such as Bresnahan and Reiss (1987), entry can only decrease when costs rise.
Thus, this relatively simple model generates interesting, varied, and non-obvious re-
sponses to the cost changes. The possibilities for entry and exit are listed in Table 1. The
most intuitive case is the competitor neutral case, in which entry decreases and exit in-
creases in response to the cost changes. When entry increases, it can be shown that the
scale of entry also increases. Thus, since total market quantity falls by Proposition 1.1,
entry can increase only at the expense of the number of incumbents, the quantity each in-
cumbent produces, or both. When entry declines and the resulting lessening of competitive
pressure allows more incumbents to stay in the market, so that exit also declines, we have15
the incumbent favoring case. Finally, we term the case in which entry increases and the
number of incumbents falls entrant favoring. Note that all changes in Table 1 are with
reference to the same period in the baseline in which no costs changes, not with reference
to changes in entry and exit over time.
Examining when the various cases occur allows us to link changes in entry and exit
with the unobserved (in the data) changes in cost. Recall that the effect of the ADA is to
raise marginal cost c and ﬁxed cost φ. The following proposition characterizes the impacts
that the changes in cost have on entry and exit.
Proposition 2 (Restrictions on Observed Outcomes) Using the deﬁnitions from Table 1,
the following hold:
1. When marginal cost increases, the incumbent favoring case is not possible.
2. When ﬁxed cost increases, if demand is inelastic at the equilibrium price the entrant
favoring case is not possible.
The proof of the proposition is in Prieger (2004a), but the insight is presented here. For
any cohort k, the change in the number of ﬁrms in the market due to an increase in cost can
be decomposed into a negative direct effect and a positive price effect. The direct effect
reﬂects that because production is more expensive when costs rise, the threshold ﬁxed cost
decreases and fewer ﬁrms remain in the market (or enter). There is a countervailing price
effect, however. Thecostincreaseleads toanincreaseinequilibriumprice, whichincreases
proﬁt for each ﬁrm. With higher proﬁt, more ﬁrms remain in the market (or enter). The
direct and price effects thus move in opposite directions, and either can predominate in
general. However, in particular cases more can be said.16
Consider increases in marginal cost. If the number of ﬁrms increases for any cohort,
it can be shown that it increases for the entering cohort, so the incumbent favoring out-
come cannot happen (Proposition 2.1). When entry increases (the entrant favoring case)
an increase in marginal cost hurts the proﬁt of incumbents more than of entrants because
existing ﬁrms sell more, and thus suffer greater inframarginal loss. The greater exit of in-
cumbents results in a price increase that exceeds the marginal cost increase, spurring entry
by new ﬁrms. On the other hand, when ﬁxed cost rises and demand is inelastic, then if the
number of ﬁrms rises for any cohort it rises for the oldest cohorts. Thus entrant favoring is
not possible (Proposition 2.2).27 The other two cases, competitor neutrality and incumbent
favoring, are both possible when ﬁxed cost rises. If exit decreases enough from the oldest
cohorts, the incumbent favoring case can result. In this case the increase in cost dispropor-
tionately hurts the small ﬁrms (including entrants), because their smaller scale leaves them
more vulnerable to increases in ﬁxed costs. In Prieger (2004a) we explore why entrant and
incumbent favoring happen in greater detail.
The implications of the model useful for empirical work are thus as follows. When
demand is inelastic (as it is in the empirical application to food stores), an entrant fa-
voring outcome from the ADA can come only from increases in x, or through ΛT and ΛV,
which increase marginal cost. Furthermore, an incumbent favoring outcome can come only
through ΛH and ΛF, which increase ﬁxed cost. The competitor-neutral outcome implies no
restrictions on the nature of the cost increase. In section 6, we use these two implications
of the model to infer which elements of the ADA raised which costs.
27Inelastic demand is in fact sufﬁcient but not necessary for Proposition 2.2. The much weaker necessary
condition is that ε(p − c)/p < 1 in equilibrium, where ε is the elasticity of demand.17
5 Data and Empirical Models
One would expect that if the ADA impacted any ﬁrms, it would be those in the retail sec-
tor. Retail ﬁrms are exposed to costs under both Title I through employment and Title
III through access by customers to their premises. The retail sector has many small ﬁrms
o p e r a t i n go nt h i nm a r g i n s , 28 a n di sa l s oi n v o l v e di nm a n yo ft h eA D Al a w s u i t s .T h ed e -
pendent variable in the estimations here is therefore the number of retail establishments by
major SIC group within a county; the data cover the whole U.S. except Alaska.29 Summary
statistics of the data are presented in Table 2.
To get a sense of the overall trends in the data, consider Figure 1, which shows the
percentage changes in the total number of retail establishments by two-digit SIC code.
Some subsectors are growing and some are shrinking, but (with several exceptions) each
line in the graph generally trends down. Except for SIC 52 (building materials and garden
supplies) and 53 (general merchandise stores), every group saw decreased growth rates in
1993, the ﬁrst full year the ADA was in effect, compared to the previous year. In all but one
of these cases (SIC 58, eating and drinking places), growth was negative in 1993. Given
that the ADA may be a relatively minor determinant of the number of ﬁrms, however,
compared to changes in demand and other costs, and given the dynamic industry behavior
predicted by the model in section 4 even in the absence of the ADA, Figure 1 should not
be read as strong evidence by itself for impacts of the ADA. Instead, it may mainly show
the trends that we will have to difference out in the analysis.
Although results from all retail subsectors are summarized below, we focus on SIC 54,
28By 1980, 93.4% of the sector was effectively competitive, based on concentration ratios (Shepherd,
1982).
29The data are from the U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns CD-ROM, years 1987-1997. Al-
though establishments are not the same as ﬁrms, an establishment may be judged an “employer” under the
ADA even if it is not a distinct legal entity (EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial School, 326 U.S. App.
D.C. 67).18
food stores (the heavy line in Figure 1).30 Food stores were chosen for several reasons.
They appear to be among the most vulnerable to cost changes within the retail sector.31
Food stores also have relatively small, local markets, for which counties may be an ade-
quate approximation. Establishments in other retail groups, such as SIC 53 (which includes
department stores) and 55 (which includes automotive dealers) are more likely to have mar-
ket areas that span multiple counties. Furthermore, in comparison to restaurants (SIC 58),
the other natural choice by theﬁrst two criteria, the relatively smaller number of food stores
per county makes the estimation of the heterogeneous models more feasible.32 Finally, de-
mand for food consumed at home, which these stores sell, is consistently estimated in the
literature to be inelastic (e.g., Barnes and Gillingham, 1984). Restricting investigation to a
good with inelastic demand allows part 2 of Proposition 2 to be applied.33
I nt h er e s to ft h i ss e c t i o nw ep r e s e n tt h ee c o n o m e t r i cm o d e l su s e di nt h ei n v e s t i g a -
tion. The data are a panel of establishment counts by county and year. The ﬁrst question
to investigate is the effect of the ADA on the number of ﬁrms. To answer this question,
we use standard count data models. The ﬁrst is a Poisson regression model estimated
on the pooled data, which yields consistent estimates even if there are county-speciﬁco r
county-year-speciﬁc randomeffects leading to clustering and overdispersion (Cameron and
30SIC major group 54 includes retail stores primarily engaged in selling food for home preparation and
consumption (grocery stores). It excludes restaurants and liquor stores. The other major retail groups are
52 (building materials & garden supplies), 53 (general merchandise stores), 55 (automotove dealers & ser-
vice stations), 56 (apparel and accessory stores), 57 (furniture and homefurnishings stores), 58 (eating and
drinking places), and 59 (miscellaneous retail).
31Food stores have a lower gross margin (as percent of sales) than any other two-digit retail segment
except automotive dealers (U.S. Census Bureau, 1999). The sector also was relatively unconcentrated during
the study period; the four largest ﬁrms accounted for only 15% of sales in 1992 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1995).
There is evidence, however, that the grocery store subcategory is considerably more concentrated in local
markets (Cotterill, 1993).
32Estimation time for the CMt/CMt/∞ model is proportional to the sum of the dependent variable, not
the number of observations.
33This is another reason not to use SIC 58. Food consumed away from home is often estimated to have
price elastic demand (Barnes and Gillingham, 1984).19
Trivedi, 1998, sec. 3.2.3). All standard errors are calculated with the Huber-White sand-
wich estimator, which is robust to county-level clustering and overdispersion in the Poisson
model. If the regressors are correlated with the county-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects, however, the
Poisson model is not consistent. To address this possibility, we also estimate a ﬁxed effects
Poisson model (Hausman, Hall and Griliches, 1984), which is analogous to the familiar
“within” estimator for linear panel models.34
The other question of interest is the effect of the ADA on entry and exit. Pursuing
structural estimation based on the theoretical model in the previous section is impractical,
given that data on entry and exit are not available. Instead, we take a simpler approach and
posit reduced-form entry and exit processes. Because entry and exit are not observed, we
derive the likelihood for the number of currently operating ﬁrms. The model adopted to
recover entry and exit rates is an extension of a simple M/M/∞ queuing system.35 In a
M/M/∞ system the number of entering ﬁrms each period follows the Poisson distribution
and survival after entry follows the exponential distribution. Our ﬁrst extension is to intro-
duce dependence in the entry and exit rates on covariates that evolve period to period. We
also add correlated random effects in the entry and exit rates. Conditional on these random
effects, entry and exit are Markovian; unconditionally, overdispersion and duration depen-
dence is allowed in the processes. We denote the model a CMt/CMt/∞ queuing system,
where the CM is for “conditionally Markovian” and the subscript denotes rates that vary
each period. In this queuing system, each period nature ﬁrst draws a pair of heterogeneity
terms that enter the speciﬁcation of the rates for the entry and exit processes. The random
34Standard errors for the ﬁxed-effects Poisson model are calculated via bootstrapping to account for
clustering.
35Kendall notation provides a compact description of a queuing system: an A/B/c system has interarrival
time distribution A, service time distribution B,a n dc servers. A and B are chosen from a few traditional
symbolssuchasM fortheexponentialdistribution(foritsMarkovianproperty). Systems withinﬁnite servers
never experience waiting time before service begins.20
effects36 and the period-speciﬁc rates determine the distribution for the number of entering
ﬁrms and a ﬁrm’s lifetime distribution. The latent entry and exit processes generate an
observed number of ﬁrms in the market in each period.
With this overview of the model in hand, we now describe in detail how we construct
the ML estimator for the parameters of the CMt/CMt/∞ system. The entry of ﬁr m si sa
nonhomogeneous Poisson process with gamma mixing. In particular, the interarrival times
(the epochs between the times at which entry occurs), conditional on a gamma-distributed
heterogeneity random variable u, are exponentially distributed with instantaneous rate λ(t)
at time t. The lifetime of each entrant, conditional on another gamma-distributed het-
erogeneity random variable v, is exponentially distributed with instantaneous rate µ(t).
Conditional on (u,v), the entry and exit processes are independent; dependence is intro-
duced by means of correlation between u and v. The random effects capture the effect of
unobserved factors in the market on entry and exit.
In our data the number of establishments is observable, but not the entry and exit times.
We derive the likelihood function for the number of ﬁrms using techniques from queuing
theory (Srivastava and Kashyap, 1982).37 For the substantially easier problem where the
arrival and exit times are observable, see Prieger (2001; 2002a;2 0 0 2 b) for models and
applications. To economize on notation, the model will be explicated for a single time
series of ﬁrm counts; the cross-sectional dimension will be introduced later. Let N(s) be
the random variable generating the number of ﬁrms (i.e., ﬁrms that have entered but not
exited) at time s ∈ [0,T], n(s) be a realization of N(s),a n dnt be the number of units in
the system at the end of period t ∈ {1,...,T}. For simplicity each period is of unit length
36Such heterogeneity terms are also known as mixing terms.
37For a more advanced theoretical treatment of queues with time-varying parameters, refer to Brémaud
(1981, section VI.2).21
(one year, in the application), so that nt = n(t).
The entry rate λ(s) and the failure rate µ(s) are taken to be constant within a period, so
that λ(s)=λt and µ(s)=µt for s ∈ [t − 1,t). The rates are modeled as:
λt =e x p( X
0
tα)ut = λ0tut (3)
µt =e x p( Z
0
tβ)vt = µ0tvt,( 4 )
where α and β are vectors of parameters, Xt and Zt are vectors of observed explanatory










v > 0 (5)







v govern the variance of u and v, respectively (see appendix). In
addition to the restrictions on the parameters in (5), it is also necessary that τ>−(2σ2
v)−1
for the variance of u to be ﬁnite. The shape parameters γ and δ are normalized so that
E(u)=E(v)=1 , which is required for identiﬁcation of the intercept terms in α and β.
With these restrictions, Va r(v)=σ2
v, Va r(u|v) is linear in σ2
u,a n dVa r(u) is afﬁne in σ2
u
(see appendix). Correlation between u and v, ρ, is a function of τ. The correlation has the
same sign as τ, can take the full range of values on [−1,1], is zero if and only if τ =0 ,b u t
is not in general monotonic in τ.
From (5) it can be seen that v has a marginal Gamma distribution and u has a Gamma
distribution conditional on v.39 We choose a conditional Gamma distribution for u purely
38This distribution is from Gran (1992, sec.2.7.5).
39No structural interpretation is assigned to this formulation (i.e., that entry depends on exit but not vice
versa). Of course v also has a distribution conditional on u.22
for convenience; it allows analytic integration of the unobserved heterogeneity in the entry
process. Numerical integration is required to integrate out v.40
Gamma mixing in Poisson and exponential distributions has well-known properties and
is commonly used, because it leads to closed-form likelihoods. The Gamma-Poisson mix-
ture for entry results in a negative binomial random variable that allows for overdispersion
(for which the Poisson distribution alone cannot account). A Gamma-exponential mixture
for the ﬁrms’ lifetimes results in a Pareto distribution, and relaxes the exponential’s im-
position of a constant hazard rate (Johnson, Kotz and Balakrishnan, 1995, p.574). As is
true with any mixture of exponentials, the hazard rate for a Gamma-exponential mixture is
decreasing, which implies that there is negative duration dependence and overdispersion.41
Dubey (1966) also uses Gamma-exponential mixtures for ﬁrm lifetime data.
The heterogeneity in the model thus exhibits properties that ﬁt the stylized facts of ﬁrm
entry and exit mentionedi ns e c t i o n3 :o v e r d i s p e r s i o nt oa c c o u n tf o rt h el a r g ev a r i a n c ei n
entry and exit rates across industry groups, correlation between the entry and exit rates,
and duration dependence in the life of the ﬁrm. The CMt/CMt/∞ model thus combines
ﬂexibility through the random effects to account for these features, with the analytical
convenience of a Markovian queuing system. The former is desirable to ﬁt the stylized
facts; the latter is necessary to ﬁnd a (near) closed form for the likelihood.
From the model speciﬁed above, the likelihood of the data can be obtained (see ap-
pendix). Finding the pdf of nt given nt−1, denoted f(nt|nt−1), requires taking expectation
over ut and vt, a bivariate integral. The expectation can be solved analytically over ut but
not over vt, leaving a unidimensional integral in the expression for f(nt|nt−1).I nt h ea p -
40There is no bivariate distribution with correlation for which both the marginal and conditional distribu-
tions are Gamma (Arnold, Castillo and Sarabia, 1999, sec.4.6).
41In particular, one can show that mean time remaining to exit, conditional on survival to t, increases
linearly in t.23
plication, we use Gauss-Laguerre quadrature to numerically integrate this expression. To
ﬁnd the joint likelihood of the data (nt)T
t=1,n o t et h a tN(t) is a Markov process. Therefore
f (n1,...,n T|n0)=
QT
t=1 f (nt|nt−1). Now we may introduce the cross-sectional dimen-
sion of the panel, and write nt as nkt, the number of ﬁrms in county k in year t.A s s u m i n g
that (ukt,v kt) are independent across time and county, the log likelihood function for the
parameter vector θ =( α,β,σ2
u,σ 2















where f (nkt|nkt−1) i sg i v e ni n( 3 0 ) .
Let ˆ θ be the estimate obtained from maximizing lθ. If the heterogeneity terms (ukt,v kt)
areindependentover time then ˆ θ is afully-efﬁcient ML estimate. If theheterogeneity terms
are not independent over time within the same county (i.e., if there is county-level cluster-
ing), then ˆ θ is an inefﬁcient but consistent partial ML estimate.42 Because the Hessian is
complicated and expensive to calculate, maximization techniques and variance estimators
that require only the gradient are an appealing choice here. We use the BFGS variant of the
DFP algorithm in the application. All standard errors are calculated with the Huber-White
sandwich estimator using the BHHH estimated variance matrix, which is robust to county-
level clustering. The gradient of lθ is straightforward to calculate (although it also requires
numerical integration). Prieger (2004b) contains more details on estimating the model.
6 Empirical Results
In this section we apply the econometric models from the previous section to the retail
establishment data to look for effects of the ADA on the number, entry rate, and exit rate of
42The asymptotics require ﬁxed T and K →∞ . See Wooldridge (2001), sec. 13.8 on the partial MLE.24
ﬁrms. We also apply the insight gained from the theoretical model of section 4 to discern
which aspects of the ADA are most important in creating additional costs for ﬁrms. We
use three empirical speciﬁcations, moving from differences in means pre- and post-ADA to
differences-in-differences speciﬁcations. The speciﬁcations provide increasingly stringent
tests of whether the link we ﬁnd between the ADA and negative industry effects is causal.
6.1 Speciﬁcation A: differences in means
The simplest speciﬁcation, A, uses the number of ﬁrms of all sizes per county in a year and
focuses on differences in mean establishment counts, entry, and exit before and after the
ADA. In the standard count data models, the mean number of ﬁrms in county k and year t
is speciﬁed as an exponential function of a linear index X0
ktβ,w i t h
X
0
ktβ = β0 + υs + ϕt + π
0Wkt (8)
where υs i sas t a t eﬁxed effect and ϕt i say e a rﬁxed effect with ϕ1988 normalized to zero.
Covariates W include county land area, population, per capita real income, and labor cost
(average real wage and salary disbursements per job), all in logs. In speciﬁcation A, the
only evidence for the ADA’s effect comes from ϕt for the ADA years, which capture
changes in the number of ﬁrms after the act was in effect. Such evidence can only be
suggestive, since the year indicators may me r e l yp i c ku pt r e n d su n r e l a t e dt ot h eA D A .
The ﬁrst results are from the Poisson models for the number of establishments (Table
3). The three estimations reported are Poisson regressions with and without state dummy
variables and a ﬁxed-effects Poisson estimation. Proposition 1 by itself does not rule out
that the number of ﬁrms may rise from the ADA, given that smaller entrants can replace
larger incumbents when costs rise. Thus we have no ap r i o r iexpectation for the signs of
the ADA-related variables in these estimations, although the most natural expectation is25
that if the ADA increased costs then the number of ﬁrms should fall. The coefﬁcients are
elasticities when the variable is in logs (all except indicator variables). The negative and
signiﬁcant ˆ ϕt for the ADA period 1993-1997 in all models implies that the number of ﬁrms
decreased in the ADAperiods, even after controlling for changes in theeconomicvariables.
The decreases range from 6% to 13% in the Poisson estimations and 2% to 6% in the ﬁxed-
effects estimation, with the larger decreases coming in the later years.43 The economic
covariates have intuitive signs. Greater population, population density (πpop − πarea), and
income and lower labor costs are correlated with a higher number of ﬁrms in the county.
Although the magnitudes are generally smaller in the ﬁxed-effects estimation (the right-
most set of columns in Table 3) than the pooled Poisson estimations, the qualitative results
are similar in all three estimations. Results (not reported) from alternative random-effects
Poisson and negative binomial models are also similar. The results from six of the seven
other two-digit SIC retail categories are qualitatively very similar with these results from
food stores.44
Thetheoretical model insection 4showsthat examiningentryandexitinadditiontothe
number of ﬁrms can provide insight into how the ADA changed ﬁrms’ costs. We turn now
to theCMt/CMt/∞modelfor entryand exit fromsection5. Themean entry and exitrates
λ and µ for the CMt/CMt/∞ model are also exponential functions of indices speciﬁed
as in (8) (i.e., X0
ktβ also stands in for the indices X0
tα and Z0
tβ in the notation of section
5). A few changes are made to reduce the number of parameters to be estimated. The year
indicators are grouped into three periods: the pre-ADA period 1988-1992 (ϕ1 =0 ,t h e
omitted variable), the initial ADA period 1993-1994 (ϕ2), and the subsequent ADA period,
43The percentage change in the mean dependent variable from a binary variable like ϕt is exp(ϕt) − 1.
44The exception is SIC 58, for which ϕt is positive during the ADA periods and larger than before the
ADA.26
1995-1997 (ϕ3). Period 2 spans the ﬁr s tf u l ly e a rt h a tt h eA D Aw a sf u l l yi ne f f e c tf o ra n y
size ﬁrm(1993)and theend ofthe phase-in period(1994; refertosection2). The stateﬁxed
effects are replaced with Census region indicators. Added to W is log capital cost, proxied
by the Moody’s Baa bond rate (capital cost is absorbed into the year ﬁxed effects in (8)).
The speciﬁcations of the entry and exit rates are identical (in this and all speciﬁcations).
There is no exclusion restriction required for identiﬁcation, and none could be defended on
economic grounds, given that any variable affecting proﬁtability affects both entry and exit
decisions.
The results from speciﬁcation A for the CMt/CMt/∞ model are in Table 4, both with
and without random effects (heterogeneity). Several results stand out from these estima-
tions. Entry rates were signiﬁcantly lower and failure rates were signiﬁcantly higher in
the ADA periods than the pre-ADA period in both speciﬁcations. If all such changes can
be ascribed to the ADA, this is the competitor neutral case. The estimates from other re-
tail SIC groups, with some exceptions, display the same pattern as these results for food
stores.45 The economic coefﬁcients have the expected signs in the entry rate (larger area,
more population and higher per capita income all increase the arrival rate; higher labor
costs decrease the entry rate) except for capital costs in the homogeneous speciﬁcation.46
In the failure rate part of the homogeneous speciﬁcation, the population coefﬁcient has
an unexpected sign: more populous counties have higher failure rates. The heterogeneous
speciﬁcation reverses the sign on the population failure rate coefﬁcient. The homogeneous
speciﬁcation is soundly rejected in favor of the random effects version, whether by signif-
45The exceptions: for entry, 4 out of the 14 ADA period indicators from all other SIC groups are signiﬁcant
and positive (homogeneous speciﬁcation); for exit, 3 out of the 14 ADA period indicators are signiﬁcant and
negative. The unlikely case (positive for entry and negative for exit) never occurs.
46In many estimations in other SIC groups, capital costs also had the wrong sign. This is probably because
the variable is a poor proxy for the true opportunity cost of capital or that it is acting as a peculiar type of
time trend (recall the capital cost variable varies only over time, not in the cross section).27
icance tests on σ2
u, σ2
v,a n dτ, or by likelihood ratio tests. The evidence thus indicates that
the random effects are an important addition to the model and may be required to get sensi-
ble estimates from the CMt/CMt/∞ model. Correlation between the arrival and exit rates
is estimated to be negative, possibly due to omitted variables that affect the proﬁtability
of the market. Correlation is estimated to be negative in every estimate for all retail SIC
groups.
6.2 Speciﬁcation B: ADA-speciﬁcc o v a r i a t e s
To investigate whether the ADA had anything to do with the decline in the number of
ﬁr m sa n dt h ec h a n g e si nﬁrm dynamics shown in speciﬁcation A, in speciﬁcation B we add
ADA-speciﬁc covariates. The dependent variable remains total ﬁrms of all sizes. Using
the results and notation of section 4, we know that marginal cost increases with x, ΛT,a n d
ΛV,t h a tﬁxed cost increases with ΛH and ΛF,a n dt h a tΛF and ΛV increase with y.S i n c e
the litigation variables ΛT, ΛV, ΛH,a n dΛF are not directly observed, we proxy them with
related observables. The index is speciﬁed as
X
0
ktβ = β0 + υs + ϕt + ηpest−1 + ζpcst−1 + ωpdst−1 + ξpfs + π
0Wkt (9)
where W includes all the variables from speciﬁcation A. Parameters (β0,υs,ϕ t) are as in
(8). The employment litigation costs ΛH andΛT increase with the probabilities of litigation
( H and  T). We proxy these probabilities by the EEOC charge rate in state s,l a g g e do n e
year. Thechargeratevariableest−1 isthenumberofEEOCADATitleIchargesin thestate,
as a fraction of prime working age disabled population (aged 21-58), times 1,000.47 Hiring
and termination charges are not distinguished in the EEOC data; evidence on which places
47The EEOC data were obtained as summary counts per state through a Freedom of Information Act
request. The disability data are from the U.S. Census’ Current Population Survey, following Acemoglu and
Angrist (2001).28
greater costs on ﬁrms will come from application of Proposition 2. The charge rate (and the
TitleIIIcaseratedescribedbelow)islaggedtoavoidreversecausationbetweencurrentﬁrm
dynamics and worker complaints. For example, when many ﬁrms are exiting, employees
may ﬁle fewer labor complaints because they are in transition to new jobs anyway. The
coefﬁcient on est−1 is ηp,w h e r ep =2 ,3 indexes the two ADA periods.
Similarly, the accessibility litigation costs ΛF and ΛV increase with the number of
suits (sF and sV). Instead of proxying the number of suits (which is highly correlated
with population), we proxy the probability of accommodation suit-ﬁl i n g . T h ec a s er a t e
variable cst−1 (with coefﬁcient ζp) is the number of Title III-related federal court cases in
state s in year t − 1, as a fraction of disabled adult population (aged 15+ years), times
1,000.48 As with the EEOC charges, we will use Proposition 2 to infer whether the Title III
cases increase marginal or ﬁxed costs more. The coefﬁcients for the charge and case rate
variables are semi-elasticities.
Finally, because of the high correlation between the fractions of the labor force (x)a n d
population (y) that are disabled, we include a single variable dst−1 to proxy both. This
variable (with coefﬁcient ωp) is the log fraction of adult population (aged 15+ years) in the
state that is disabled in year t (times 100), lagged one year.
Although every state had some sort of Fair Employment Practice (FEP) law before the
ADA, and all but three prohibited disability-based discrimination in hiring and ﬁring, not
all of these laws had teeth. The variable fs is an indicator for states that had a “strong” FEP
law with sanctions before the ADA (fs =1if the state had a strong pre-ADA FEP law, 0
if not).49 Sanctions include misdemeanor charges and civil penalties; these are in addition
48The case data were obtained from a search of the Lexis database (all federal trial, appellate, and Supreme
Court cases) for cases matching keywords “ADA” and “public accommodation” or “Title III”. Although this
is not as accurate a means of classiﬁcation as reviewing each of the numerous cases individually, a check of
the cases matched showed this method to be fairly accurate.
49These data are from Percy (1989). Jolls and Prescott (2004) and Jolls (2004) categorize states’ pre-ADA29
to the monetary damages available under all states’ FEP laws . Title I of the ADA was less
of an innovation in states with strong FEP laws, and the ADA should have had less of an
impact. If there is less entry in the weaker FEP states after the ADA, for example, then ˆ ξ2
and ˆ ξ3 will be positive in the entry index.
All the ADA-related coefﬁcients are allowed to vary between periods; since the Title
I and Title III variables are not observed in period 1, we normalize ζ1 = η1 =0 .I nt h e
results, we report differenced estimates (i.e., increments over the period 1 effect) where
applicable; for ωp we report ˆ ω1, ˆ ω2 − ˆ ω1,a n dˆ ω3 − ˆ ω1, for example. The coefﬁcients on fs
are reported as difference-in-differences (D-D) estimates: ˆ ξ2−ˆ ξ1 andˆ ξ3−ˆ ξ1, the difference
(between strong FEP and other states) in the difference in X0
ktβ before and after the ADA.
Although all the variables in speciﬁc a t i o nAa r ei n c l u d e di ns p e c i ﬁcation B, only the
ADA-speciﬁcc o e f ﬁcients are reported in Tables 5 and 6. Of interest here are the difference
and D-D estimates. For the count models in Table 5, with the exception of the Title III
case rate, all of these estimates have signs associating the ADA with a decreased number
of ﬁrms. In particular, the coefﬁcients for the percentage of disabled adults and the EEOC
charge rate are negative in the ADA periods. The coefﬁcient for states with strong FEP
laws is positive, which is also consistent with the ADA causing the number of ﬁrms to fall.
These signs are robust across models, and with a few exceptions are all signiﬁcant at the
1% level. The Title III case rate coefﬁcient switches sign across speciﬁc a t i o n sa n di nn o t
signiﬁcant in ﬁve out of six cases. We defer interpreting the magnitudes of the estimates
until section 6.5. The results from the other retail groups are generally in accord with these
results from SIC 54.50
FEP laws differently; see section 6.4 for discussion.
50The main exceptions are the FEP coefﬁcients, which have mixed signs, and the disability coefﬁcients for
the latter ADA period, which are more often positive than negative.30
Table 6 has the results from speciﬁcation B for the CMt/CMt/∞ model. The ver-
sions with and without heterogeneity are generally in agreement; there are no (statistically
signiﬁcant) sign changes of the estimates between versions. Of the signiﬁcant estimates,
the EEOC charge rates and the percentage of adults disabled in both ADA periods show
incumbent favoring behavior.51 From Proposition 2, this implies that these variables (on
net) raise ﬁxed costs.52 The result for the charge rates implies that the ADA raised hiring
costs (through  H and ΛH from section 4) more than termination costs (through  T and
ΛT). This seems unlikely; Moss et al. (1999) report that fewer than 10 percent of the ADA
charges ﬁl e dw i t ht h eE E O Cc o n c e r nh i r i n gd i s c r i m ination. We return to this issue in the
next speciﬁcation.
Recall that the disability variable dst stands in for the fraction of the labor force and
population that is disabled (x and y of section 4, resp.). The disability variables raise ﬁxed
costsbyincreasingΛH, thecostofhiringdiscriminationsuits (throughx)andby increasing
ΛF, a component of the cost of accessibility suits (through y). Setting aside the possibility
of signiﬁcant impacts through hiring-related suits, the incumbent favoring impact of the
disability variable may imply that “serial suers” or other litigants have signiﬁcant impacts
onentryby raising theexpected cost ofaccessibilitylawsuits (orothersuchsuits notrelated
to the scale of the businesses), ΛF. Another explanation for the incumbent favoring, apart
from the implications of Proposition 2, may be that negative impacts from the disability
variable show up on entry and not exit if potential entrants perceive the costs from ADA
s u i t st ob el a r g e rt h a n incumbents actually ﬁnd them to be.
The other signiﬁcant estimates are the Title III case rates and the strong FEP law D-D
51The estimates discussed here are those for which either the entry or failure coefﬁcient was signiﬁcant in
one or both speciﬁcations. All of these are pairwise jointly signiﬁcant.
52The results of Proposition 2 apply to small univariate increases in marginal cost c or ﬁxed cost φ.G i v e n
that both may have actually increased, “incumbent favoring” here means that the effects of the increase in φ
outweigh the effects of any increase in c.31
estimates (ﬁrst ADA period only for the latter). The Title III coefﬁcients for the second
ADA period and the strong FEP law coefﬁcients for the ﬁrst ADA period show entrant
favoring behavior. Proposition 2 therefore implies that these variables raise marginal costs.
For the case rate variable, this result is consistent with the ADA imposing real litigation
costs ΛV from accessibility suits from customers. However, we show in the next section
that this result does not persist when trends common to all sizes ofﬁrms areremoved. Also,
the Title III entry coefﬁcient for the ﬁrst ADA period is negative. We return to the Title
III estimates in the next section. The results for the strong FEP laws imply that marginal
costs increased more in states for which the ADA was more of an legal innovation (at least
during the ﬁrst ADA period). This latter result may indicate that overall, the ADA helped
entrants at the expense of incumbents. The estimates from other retail SIC groups, with
few exceptions, are in accord with these results for food stores.53 Therefore, combining
all results from this section, there is much evidence that the ADA had real impacts on the
number, entry, and exit of stores in the retail sector. Speciﬁcation B does not, however, take
advantage of the fact that small ﬁrms are likely to be more vulnerable to costs imposed by
the ADA than larger ﬁrms. In the next section we use large ﬁr m sa sac o n t r o lg r o u pt o
strengthen the conclusions of this section.
6.3 Speciﬁcation C: difference-in-differences
In speciﬁcation C, we split the dependent variable into size groups. Here the dependent
variable is the number of ﬁrms within each size group: small (1-19 employees), medium
(20-49 employees), and large (50+ employees), and the independent variables are as in
53The signiﬁcant exceptions (homogeneous speciﬁcation) are: in SIC 56 (apparel stores), EEOC charge
rates favor entry in period 3 and non-FEP status favors incumbents period 2; in SIC 59 (miscellaneous retail),
disabled adults favor entry in period 3. The unlikely case never appears in any SIC group for any variable.32
speciﬁcation B. Estimations for the different size ﬁrms are run separately, which effectively
a d d sas i z es u b s c r i p tj = S,M,L to all the variables in (9). This allows all the ADA-related
v a r i a b l e st ob ed i f f e r e n c e do v e rﬁrm sizes as well as over time, and is the most demanding
test that the ADA had a causal impact on ﬁrms. In speciﬁcation C, we require not only that
the ADA-related variables affect the number of ﬁrms, entry, or exit, but that the impacts
be greater on the small ﬁrms that are most vulnerable to the ADA. By looking for impacts
on small ﬁrms, net of trends for large ﬁrms, potentially spurious trends affecting all sizes
of ﬁrms are differenced out. Recall from section 2 that the smallest ﬁrms (those with
f e w e rt h a n1 5e m p l o y e e s )a r ee x e m p tf r o mT i t l e I employment discrimination obligations.
Therefore for the Title I variable est we will also look at differences of medium size ﬁrms
from large ﬁrms. The strong FEP law coefﬁcient is triple differenced (D-D-D) in this
speciﬁcation, with differencing over states with strong and weak laws, over small and large
ﬁrms, and over time. This allows the D-D estimate for large ﬁrms to be a baseline, against
which the incremental effects for small ﬁrms can be compared.
The results are reported as D-D or D-D-D estimates. The D-D estimate labeled %a d u l t
disabled, 1993-94 in the ﬁrst row of Table 7, for example, is (ˆ ω2S − ˆ ω1S) − (ˆ ω2L − ˆ ω1L):
the difference (between small and large ﬁrms) in the difference in X0
ktβ from a unit change
in dst before and after the ADA. Similarly, the D-D-D strong FEP state estimate labeled
strong FEP state, 1993-94 is (ˆ ξ2S − ˆ ξ1S) − (ˆ ξ2L − ˆ ξ1L): the difference (between small
and large ﬁrms) in the difference (between strong FEP and other states) in the difference in
X0
ktβ before and after the ADA.
Table 7 presents the results from speciﬁcation C for the standard count models. The
table reports only the D-D and D-D-D calculations; each is the set of small or medium ﬁrm
estimates net of the large ﬁrm estimates. Of the signiﬁcant estimates for small ﬁrms, all33
have signs consistent with the ADA decreasing the number of ﬁrms. The Title III case rate
coefﬁcient for the initial ADA period again stands out; it is insigniﬁcant in all regressions.
The D-D-D coefﬁcients for the strong FEP state variables are positive in Table 7. These
D-D-D estimates imply that not only did the number of ﬁrms fall in weaker FEP states after
the ADA (from the D-D estimates in Speciﬁcation B) but that the trend is more marked for
the ADA-vulnerable small ﬁrms than for large ﬁrms. The lower part of Table 7 has the
D-D estimates of the EEOC charge rate coefﬁcients for medium ﬁrms. These estimates
are all negative, and most of them are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Taken altogether, the
evidenceis consistent with the ADAreducing the number of establishments in each market.
While causality can not directly proven here, in the D-D and D-D-D settings any alternative
explanations become increasingly complicated. The results from the other retail groups are
generally in accord with their results from speciﬁcation B.54
Table 8 contains the estimates of interest from the CMt/CMt/∞ model. With the ex-
ception of the Title III case rates, all of the incumbent favoring or entrant favoring behavior
f o u n di ns p e c i ﬁcation B carries through to the small ﬁrm D-D and D-D-D estimates.55
Thus not only are effects from the ADA-related variables signiﬁcant, they generally show
up strongest for the small ﬁrms likely to be most susceptible to the costs of the ADA. For
the accessibility estimates, the ﬁrst ADA period Title III estimates show strong incumbent
favoring, and the entry-favoring previously found for the second period Title III estimates
in speciﬁcation B disappears. The Title III results are thus brought into line with the results
for the disability variable dst; the evidence from both suggests that ﬁxed costs rose, which
54The exceptions are SIC 52 and 58, which had positive, signiﬁcant coefﬁcients for the disabled adult
variables in speciﬁcation B but negative, signiﬁcant coefﬁcients in speciﬁcation C. Differencing in these
cases brings the results closer in line with the results from SIC 54.
55The entry and exit coefﬁcients are jointly signiﬁcant for all the variables discussed in speciﬁcation B.
The entry and exit coefﬁcients for disabled population rate in ADA period 2 are individually insigniﬁcant in
speciﬁcation C but retain joint signiﬁcance.34
is consistent with accessibility suits by activists raising costs through sF and ΛF.
The suspect ﬁnding from speciﬁcation B that EEOC charge rates appear to increase
ﬁxed costs is still present for the ﬁrst ADA period when looking at small ﬁrms. However,
because of the Title I exemption for most small ﬁrms, medium size ﬁr m sp r o v i d eab e t t e r
test of the effect of the EEOC charges. The bottom part of Table 8 has the results for
the EEOC charge rate D-D estimates for medium ﬁrms (net of large ﬁrms). Here, the
Title I variable exhibits entrant favoring effects in both ADA periods, which implies from
the theoretical model that the costs of termination suits (and possibly other suits from
employees regarding accommodation56)h a v em o r eo fa ni m p a c tt h a nh i r i n gs u i t s .G i v e n
that over 81 percent of charges ﬁledwiththe EEOCconcernterminationor accommodation
of employees, this is a plausible ﬁnding.
A caveat applies to speciﬁcation C when estimating the entry and exit model. Given
the anonymous nature of individual ﬁrms in the establishment counts, true exits cannot be
distinguished from size group switching. E.g., if a ﬁr mg r o w sf r o m1 0t o4 0e m p l o y e e s
one year to the next, the econometric model treats it as an exit of a small ﬁrm and de novo
entry of a medium ﬁrm. Thus, entry and exit may be over counted in speciﬁcation C and
the magnitudes of the coefﬁcients must be interpreted with caution. By comparing entry
rate ˆ λ from speciﬁcation B with the sum of the ˆ λj for all size groups from speciﬁcation
C, one can estimate the extent of the overcounting. Arrival rates are over counted 22–25%
in the ADA periods in speciﬁcation C; similar calculation for the failure rate shows over
counting of 19–23% in the ADA periods. These ﬁgures provide rough upper bounds on
the mismeasurement of the ADA-related coefﬁcients; in a best-case scenario the category
switching is not related to the variables of interest, the estimate of the constant absorbs the
56Although not included in the model, suits from non-terminated employees would increase marginal costs
similarly to termination suits.35
mismeasurement, and the other coefﬁcients are correctly estimated.
6.4 Speciﬁcation checks
We now consider various speciﬁcation checks of the models. Since identiﬁcation of the en-
tryandfailurerateparameterscomesfromthefunctionalformsassumedforthe CMt/CMt/∞
model, it would be reassuring if the model passed econometric speciﬁcation tests. How-
ever, there is no test of parametric dynamic, discrete models of which we are aware that
is consistent against non-parametric alternatives and is feasible for our case.57 Instead we
compare the CMt/CMt/∞ estimates with those from simpler regressions using observed
establishment births and deaths as the dependent variables. As discussed above, such data
are not publicly available at the detailed SIC and county level. However, if one is willing
to lump all retail subsectors together and to aggregate to the state level, then the joint Cen-
sus/Small Business Administration Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB) dynamic data on
establishment births and deaths are available.58 In Poisson regressions not reported here,
we estimated speciﬁcation A separately for overall entry and exit in the retail sector using
the SUSB data. Even though the level of aggregation and the businesses covered differed,
the qualitative results from the SUSB data for the determinants of retail entry were close
to those reported in Table 4 (heterogeneous model): the signs of each coefﬁcient matched
(or in one case differed but were both insigniﬁcant). The coefﬁcients for the determinants
o fr e t a i le x i tf r o mt h eS U S Bd a t aw e r en o ta sclose to the analogous estimates in Table 4,
but seven out of ten of them matched sign or were both insigniﬁcant. While the similari-
ties between the estimations performed on observed ﬁrm dynamics and the establishment
57Tests we considered are either not suited to discrete data, not suited to dynamic models, or require
bootstrapping (e.g., Andrews (1997), Corradi and Swanson (2003)), which is far too computationally onerous
to be practical here.
58See http://www.census.gov/csd/susb/susbdyn.htm for a description of the data.36
counts do not provide a complete speciﬁcation check, they do lend credence to the results
from the CMt/CMt/∞ model.
Our second speciﬁcation check concerns the static speciﬁcation used in the standard
count data models for the number of ﬁrms. It is clear from (30)–(28) that the lagged de-
pendent variable enters the likelihood for the ﬁrm counts, suggesting that dynamic speciﬁ-
cations be explored. In addition to the count models mentioned above, we estimated ﬁxed
effects dynamic panel models for count data with njkt−1 appearing in the speciﬁcation
for mean counts, E(njkt|njkt−1,Xjkt), following the quasi-differencing GMM approach of
Chamberlain (1992). The magnitudes of these GMM estimates proved to be quite sensi-
tive to the choice of weighting matrix used in the GMM criterion function and we do not
include the results here. However, the signs of the coefﬁcients generally matched those
of the static ﬁxed effects model in the third pair of columns in Tables 3, 5, and 7 (for the
analogous speciﬁcations) and none of the qualitative conclusions change.59
Finally, some other studies classify states’ pre-ADA laws differently than we do. In-
stead of categorizing state laws on the basis of sanctions (which follows Acemoglu and
Angrist (2001)), Jolls (2004) and Jolls and Prescott (2004) classify states as full-protection
(FP), limited protection (LP), or no-protection (NP) states. FP states had pre-ADA laws
requiring employers to avoid disability-based discrimination in hiring and ﬁring and to
provide reasonable accommodations to disabled workers. LP states had laws lacking the
reasonable accommodation provision, and the three NP states had no disability discrimina-
tion laws. To investigate this alternative approach, we re-estimated the Poisson regressions
59In particular: in speciﬁcation A the ADA year dummies are all signiﬁcantly negative; in speciﬁcation
B the signiﬁcant coefﬁcients (percentage of disabled adults in the second ADA period and the FEP D-D
estimates in both ADA periods) all have signs associating the ADA with a decreased number of ﬁrms; in
speciﬁcation C all eight ADA-speciﬁcc o e f ﬁcients in Table 7 except one are signiﬁcant and have signs con-
sistent with the ADA decreasing the number of ﬁrms. The exception is the differenced Title III case rate
coefﬁcient for the ﬁrst ADA period, which is positive.37
for speciﬁcation B including as the only ADA-related variables a full set of FEP categories,
interacting our “strong law” categorization with the alternative FP/LP/NP classiﬁcation,
leading to ﬁve groups: FP/strong, LP/strong, FP/not strong, LP/not strong, and NP. The
results (not reported) show that the only category signiﬁcantly different from the others
is LP/strong, which has a coefﬁcient positive and larger than those for any other group in
both ADA periods. If the states in this group are different due mainly to the extent of pro-
tection afforded by the state law, then the unintuitive interpretation is that where the ADA
created new requirements, there was an increase in the number of ﬁrms. If the difference
is due mainly to whether the state law had teeth, however, then the more natural interpre-
tation follows that states in which the ADA created new penalties saw the number of ﬁrms
decrease.
6.5 The overall impact of the ADA
To gauge the overall impact of the ADA on the ﬁrms, in Table 9 we show the magnitudes
of the effects of the ADA variables. In the table we calculate the number of small and
medium size ﬁrms “lost” when the ADA is implemented by subtracting the number of
establishments in a “no ADA” counterfactual from the actual ﬁgures. In the counterfactual,
we assume there are no EEOC charges or Title III cases, since without the ADA neither
would have been possible (medium ﬁrms only for the former, due to the inapplicability of
Title I to most of the small ﬁrms). We also assume in the counterfactual that there were
no incremental effects in states with weak FEP laws compared to those with strong FEP
laws in the ADA periods, on the logic that any such effects were due to the legal innovation
of the ADA. To be conservative, we do not assume that the impact of disabled workers
changes in the counterfactual, given that their impact on ﬁrms may have changed over time38
due to factors other than the ADA (for example, through changes in state law). All ﬁgures
are calculated using coefﬁcients from speciﬁcation C, and thus are to be interpreted as net
of trends for large ﬁrms.
The ﬁrst three columns of Table 9 show the total impact of the ADA (deﬁned as the
difference between the actual number of ﬁrms and the estimated number of ﬁrms in the
counterfactual) on the number of small and medium ﬁrms, with one column for each stan-
dard count data model in Table 7. The estimates range from 2,279 to 2,644 fewer small and
medium ﬁrms nationally (1.4–1.6% of actual ﬁrms) during the initial ADA period and from
2,572 to 3,684 (1.6–2.3%) fewer small and medium ﬁrms during the later ADA period, de-
pending on the estimation.60 The large majority of these losses come from small ﬁrms. The
other columns in Table 9 show the ADA impacts using the CMt/CMt/∞ model estimates
from Table 8. The CMt/CMt/∞ estimations imply that overall, entry and exit increase
due to the ADA, with the latter outweighing the former so that the number of ﬁrms falls.61
The implied changes in the number of ﬁrms from the CMt/CMt/∞ estimates are smaller
than those from the standard count data models, but in all cases the number of ﬁrms is
estimated to decrease due to the ADA.
These estimates are not meant to be a precise comparison to a world without the ADA.
State disability law and enforcement of existing law might have changed in the absence of
the ADA. The ADA might also have crowded out some legal action pursued under state
disability law. Furthermore, there is no way to tell how the impact of disabled workers
(either to the beneﬁt or the detriment of ﬁrms) may have changed over time without the
ADA, which is why this variable was not included in the counterfactual. With these qual-
60If the disabled variables for the ADA periods are also changed to zero in the counterfactual, the estimates
increase by an order of magnitude.
61The number of exiting ﬁrms is calculated by applying the per-ﬁrm exit rate µ to the number of ﬁrms in
the county at the end of the previous period.39
iﬁcations, and given the potential overcounting of entry and exit discussed at the end of
section 6.3, the estimates are perhaps best viewed as merely illustrative of the magnitudes
of the coefﬁcients in Tables 8 and 9.
7 Concluding Remarks
There is convincing evidence that the ADA had real impacts on the number, entry, and exit
of food stores. Although the evidence is not consistent in every speciﬁcation and in every
SIC group, the empirical results for other retail segments generally mirror those for food
stores. In the ADA period, there were 2–13% fewer retail establishments than before, and
the drop was larger in states in which the ADA was more of a legal innovation, and in
states that had more disabled people and more ADA-related labor complaints. The same
conclusions hold when baseline trends for larger establishments (those least vulnerable to
the costs imposed by the ADA) are differenced out, and in addition ADA-related accessi-
bility lawsuits are associated with declines in ﬁrm counts. There is also evidence that labor
complaints (and to a lesser extent, access discrimination suits) raised the marginal costs of
retail stores, encouraging exit. At the same time that the ADA spurred exit, however, it ap-
parently increased entry, perh a p sb e c a u s es t o r e sl e s sa b l et o adapt to the new requirements
failed and made room for new stores in the local market. So, while predictions that the
ADA would cause ﬁrms to fail may have proven correct, the decline in the number of ﬁrms
was partially offset by new entry. A conservative estimate, based only on factors directly
related to the ADA and net of trends for large ﬁrms, is that there were 1.4–2.3% fewer
small and medium ﬁrms during the ADA periods than before. These percentages translate
to 2,300–3,700 ﬁrms nationally.
To saythatthe ADAwas bad forbusinessesoverallisnot to conclude that theADAfails40
a cost-beneﬁts test. However, given the evidence of Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) that the
ADA did not improve employment prospects for the disabled, the only remaining beneﬁto f
t h el a wm a yb et h eg r e a t e rp h y s i cal accessibility requirements it mandates for businesses.
Quantifying the beneﬁts of accessibility for disabled customers would be difﬁcult, and is
beyond the scope of this work.
More generally, this paper develops theoretical and econometric models that may be
useful for many economic questions. The model of the effect of cost changes on industry
dynamics could easily be adapted to examine the impacts of other forms of cost-increasing
regulation or exogenous process innovation on industry dynamics. Furthermore, the econo-
metric CMt/CMt/∞ model may apply to any example where a quantity of interest is a
count of events in progress at a given time. For example, consider the number of ongo-
ing strikes, or the number of people receiving unemployment compensation, or visiting an
attraction. When only the count of pending spells is observed, the CMt/CMt/∞ model
allows estimation of the unobserved arrival and duration parameters. Such data arise when-
ever census methods report stock levels (e.g., population, pending stock trades, monetary
aggregates, number of patients on a waiting list) and not ﬂows.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs of results from the theoretical model.
Proof of equation (1): after the ADA, marginal production cost is still constant given the
assumptions, of form βwα,w h e r ew is the price of effective labor L + eD,i n c l u s i v eo f
accommodation costs. Adding in the accommodation cost of a and the termination cost of
ΛT per disabled worker leads to total labor expenses of wLL +( wD + a + ΛT)D.S i n c e
disabled workers are hired in proportion x and receive wage wL after the ADA, total labor
expenses are wLL+(wL + a + ΛT)Lx/(1−x)=[ wL +( a + ΛT)x]L/(1−x). The total
a m o u n to fe f f e c t i v el a b o ri sL+eD = L+eLx/(1−x)=( 1− x(1 − e))L/(1−x),s ot h a t
the factor price of effective labor is [wL +( a + ΛT)x]/[1 − x(1 − e)], found as the ratio
of the total labor expense to total effective labor. Adding in the hiring and accessibility
litigation costs results in (1). All other proofs for the theoretical model are found in Prieger
(2004a).48
A.2 Variance and correlation of entry and exit
T h ev a r i a n c eo fv is σ2
v and the variance of u|v is σ2
uvτ. To ensure that E(u)=E(v)=1 ,








v Γ(τ + δ)
(11)
With these restrictions, Va r(u|v)=σ2
uσ−2τ
v v2τg(0)/g(1) is linear in σ2




u,w h e reg(a)=Γ(aτ + σ−2
v ). Correlation

















The correlation has the same sign as τ and can take the full range of values on [−1,1].F o r
example, when τ =1 , ρ → 1 as σ2
u → 0.I fσ2
u = τ2σ2
v,t h e nρ →− 1 as τ → 0 from
below and σ2
v → 0. Correlation is zero if and only if τ =0 , but is not in general monotonic
in τ.
A.3 Derivation of the likelihood of the CMt/CMt/∞ queuing system.
From the properties of Poisson and exponential processes, when (s,s + ∆s) is strictly
w i t h i nap e r i o dw eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n g( w h e r eo(x) denotes order smaller than x):
Pr{1 arrival in interval (s,s + ∆s)} = λt∆s + o(∆s) (13)
Pr{0 arrivals in interval (s,s + ∆s)} =1− λt∆s + o(∆s).( 1 4 )
where s ∈ [t − 1,t). For any particular server we have:
Pr{1 exit in interval (s,s + ∆s)} = µt∆s + o(∆s) (15)49
Pr{0 exits in interval (s,s + ∆s)} =1− µt∆s + o(∆s).( 1 6 )
The probability of any compound event( e . g . ,a na r r i v a la n da ne x i t )i so(∆s).F o rn o ww e
treat all expressions as conditional on (u,v).
From (13)–(16) one can derive the probability of the number of units in service at time
t. Most queuing studies focus on the limiting behavior of the system, but here we are
interested in the transient behavior; in application there is no reason to assume that the
system is in steady state (or even that the system is ergodic). We begin by deriving the
likelihood for nt+1 given that N(t)=nt.
Restrict attention for the moment to behavior within a period t, during which λ and µ
are constant, and suppress the dependence on t in the notation for λ, µ,a n dn.L e tPn(s)
be the probability that N(s)=n. Then from (13)–(16) one can derive a recursive equation
for the probability that there are n units in the system at time s:
d
dt
Pn(s)=−Pn(s)(λ + nµ)+Pn+1(s)(n +1 ) µ + Pn−1(s)λ, n ≥ 0;( 1 7 )
see (Kalashnikov, 1994, p.276). Add the initial condition
Pn(t − 1) = δnt−1n (18)
where δnt−1n is the Kronecker delta ( δxy equals 1 if x = y and 0 otherwise). Equa-
tions (17)–(18) form a differential difference equation known as the forward Kolmogorov
equation, which admits a solution, after employing a generating function that reduces the
problem to a linear partial differential equation.






n,( 1 9 )
62In the rest of this section, s should, strictly speaking, be ∆s, the time elapsed in the current period.50
where z ∈ C, kzk < 1. P(z,s) allows us to restate (17)–(18) as an initial value partial
differential equation:











.( 2 1 )
The solution to this partial differential equation is
P(z,s)=cexp[−κ(1 − z)] (22)
where c is an arbitrary function φ of (z − 1)e−µs and κ ≡ λ/µ is the trafﬁci n t e n s i t y .T o
determine c,u s e( 2 0 )t oﬁnd that
φ(z − 1)exp[−κ(1 − z)] = z
nt−1 ⇒ (23)
φ(w)e










1 − (1 − z)e
−µs¤nt−1 = c (25)





¤nt−1 exp[−κA(s)(1 − z)],( 2 6 )
where A(s)=1− e−µs.N o we x p a n dt h eﬁrst term and use the power series expansion of
the exponential term to rewrite (26) as





























Pn (s) is equal to the coefﬁcient on zn in P(z,s).W h e ns has run to the end of the period,
this coefﬁcient gives us the probability of observing nt units in service at the end of period
t. It is therefore the density for nt, conditional on its lagged value nt−1 and on (ut,v t),
which enter only through λ and µ. Denote this pdf f (nt|nt−1,u t,v t).I ti s
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Finding f(nt|nt−1) requires integrating out the unobserved heterogeneity:
f (nt|nt−1)=Eu,v [f (nt|nt−1,u t,v t)] = Ev
©
Eu|v [f (nt|nt−1,u t,v t)]
ª
(29)
Begin with the inner expectation and integrate out u (which enters through λ). Due to the
assumption that u has a gamma distribution, conditional on v, the inner expectation may


































t (1 − e−µt)+1
¶nt−m#
,
˜ Bmt is as in (28) but with κ0t = λ0/µ0 replacing κt, G is as in (6), Mt ≡ min{nt−1,n t},
and restrictions (10)–(11) are imposed. The remaining integral in (30) cannot be solved
analytically, and so numerical integration is used to evaluate the density (30); see Prieger
(2004b) for details.Table 1:  Changes in Entry and Exit in Response to Cost Increases 
 
Entry of New Firms  Exit of Incumbents  Nomenclature 
decreases increases  competitor  neutral 
decreases decreases  incumbent  favoring 
increases increases  entrant  favoring 
 
  Table 2:  Description of Data 
 
Variable mean  s.d. 
Adult population disabled (percentage, log)  2.36  0.22 
Area (log sq. miles)  6.51  0.76 
Capital cost (real, x 100, log)  1.71  0.09 
EEOC charge rate (x 1000), 1992-1993  0.18  0.59 
EEOC charge rate (x 1000), 1994-1996  0.60  1.12 
FEP (state had strong pre-ADA disability law, 1=yes, 0=no)  0.32  0.47 
Labor cost (real, in thousands, log)  2.58  0.20 
Per capital income (real, in thousands, log)  2.46  0.22 
Population (log)  10.17  1.38 
Region: Midwest  (1=yes, 0=no)  0.34  0.48 
Region: South  (1=yes, 0=no)  0.45  0.50 
Region: West  (1=yes, 0=no)  0.14  0.34 
SIC 54 establishments, large, 1988-1997  5.62  17.68 
SIC 54 establishments, large, 1988-1991  5.46  17.67 
SIC 54 establishments, large, 1992-1993  5.65  17.52 
SIC 54 establishments, large, 1994-1997  5.85  17.78 
SIC 54 establishments, medium, 1988-1997  5.09  12.81 
SIC 54 establishments, medium, 1988-1991  5.33  13.47 
SIC 54 establishments, medium, 1992-1993  4.91  12.14 
SIC 54 establishments, medium, 1994-1997  4.81  12.08 
SIC 54 establishments, small, 1988-1997  48.46  149.09 
SIC 54 establishments, small, 1988-1991  49.33  149.30 
SIC 54 establishments, small, 1992-1993  48.23  150.33 
SIC 54 establishments, small, 1994-1997  47.17  147.90 
SIC 54 establishments, total, 1988-1997  59.17  177.33 
SIC 54 establishments, total, 1988-1991  60.13  178.52 
SIC 54 establishments, total, 1992-1993  58.79  177.67 
SIC 54 establishments, total, 1994-1997  57.83  175.10 
Title III case rate (x 100,000), 1992-1993 0.01  0.08 
Title III case rate (x 100,000), 1994-1996 0.12  0.35 
 
Note: unit of observation is a U.S. county, over years 1988-1997. Table 3:  Estimation Results for the Number of Firms from Standard Count 
Models—Specification A (Differences in Means Before and After the ADA) 
 
  Poisson  Poisson   Fixed Effects
   Regression 1  Regression 2  Poisson Regression 
   estimate 
  s.e. 
  estimate
  s.e.    estimate
  s.e. 
Difference-in-mean 
estimates                  
 1989  -0.010 **  (0.002)   -0.011**  (0.002)    0.002  (0.003) 
 1990  -0.008 *  (0.003)   -0.010**  (0.003)    0.011**  (0.004) 
 1991  -0.007   (0.004)   -0.008  (0.004)    0.016**  (0.005) 
 1992  -0.004   (0.004)   -0.005  (0.004)    0.025**  (0.006) 
 1993  -0.062 **  (0.006)   -0.063**  (0.006)    -0.023**  (0.008) 
 1994  -0.069 **  (0.007)   -0.071**  (0.007)    -0.022*  (0.009) 
 1995  -0.084 **  (0.008)   -0.086**  (0.007)    -0.029**  (0.010) 
 1996  -0.108 **  (0.009)   -0.111**  (0.008)    -0.045**  (0.011) 
 1997  -0.133 **  (0.011)   -0.137**  (0.010)    -0.065**  (0.012) 
Other variables                  
 area  -0.040 *  (0.019) -0.049**  (0.018)       
 population  0.942 **  (0.012) 0.932**  (0.012)    0.354**  (0.065) 
  per cap income  0.161   (0.089) 0.225**  (0.073)    -0.048  (0.054) 
 labor  cost  -0.139   (0.083) -0.180*  (0.081)    0.094  (0.079) 
  constant  -6.102 **  (0.224)   -6.107**  (0.240)       
 state  dummies  no yes      n.a.    
Log likelihood  -129,898    -119,961     -70,139 
Pseudo R
 2 0.942   0.947   0.969 
* = 5% significance level; ** = 1% significance level.   
Notes:  Dependent variable is total number of food stores (SIC 5400) in county in year.   
N = 30,578 in all estimations. Each standard error (s.e.) is robust to clustering within each 
county; s.e.’s for the fixed effects regression are calculated via bootstrap with 400 
repetitions. The excluded year dummy is 1988.  The fixed effects regression is a “within 
county” specification and is estimated by conditional MLE (assuming the effects are 
gamma distributed). 
 Table 4:  Estimation Results for Entry and Exit from CMt/CMt/∞ Model—
Specification A (Differences in Means Before and After the ADA) 
  
 No  Heterogeneity  Heterogeneity 
   estimate
  s.e.   estimate 
  s.e. 
Entry rate parameters 
      
   
Difference-in-mean estimates           
 Years  93-94  -0.049** (0.016)    -0.149  ** (0.023) 
 Years  95-97  -0.088** (0.014)    -0.084  ** (0.019) 
Other variables             
 Area  0.044** (0.009)    0.015    (0.015) 
 Population  1.025** (0.007)    0.708  ** (0.010) 
  Per cap income  0.010 (0.044)    0.233  **  (0.058) 
 Capital  cost  0.676** (0.061)    -0.102    (0.103) 
 Labor  cost  -0.154* (0.062)    -0.224  **  (0.066) 
 Midwest  -0.243** (0.023)    -0.226  ** (0.037) 
 South  0.152** (0.021)    0.129  ** (0.036) 
 West  -0.233** (0.033)    -0.074    (0.044) 
  Constant  1.298** (0.021)    0.765  ** (0.036) 
Failure rate parameters              
Difference-in-mean estimates              
 Years  93-94  0.102** (0.015)    0.209  ** (0.021) 
 Years  95-97  0.068** (0.014)    0.131  ** (0.019) 
Other variables             
 Area  0.081** (0.008)    -0.006    (0.011) 
 Population  0.065** (0.006)    -0.153  ** (0.009) 
  Per cap income  -0.095* (0.040)    -0.048    (0.047) 
 Capital  cost  1.148** (0.054)    1.273  ** (0.078) 
 Labor  cost  0.009 (0.056)      0.088   (0.060) 
 Midwest  0.056** (0.020)    0.167  ** (0.025) 
 South  0.255** (0.018)    0.205  ** (0.025) 
 West  -0.022 (0.029)    0.145  **  (0.033) 
  Constant  -1.910** (0.019)    -2.530  ** (0.026) 
Nuisance parameters 
          
σU
2      0.041  *  (0.017) 
σV
2      0.274  **  (0.007) 
τ 
     -0.542  **  (0.146) 
ρ (correlation) 
     -0.688     
Log likelihood  -77836.5    -73989.15 
Pseudo R
 2 0.446  0.090 
N  30,578 30,578 
* = 5% significance; ** = 1% significance.   
Note:  Dependent variable:  total number of food stores (SIC 5400) in county in year.  
The excluded period dummy is the pre-ADA period 1988-1992. Standard errors are 
robust to clustering within county.  Heterogeneous likelihood evaluated by 20 point 
Gauss-Laguerre quadrature.  Pseudo R
2 is 1-L1/L0, where L0 is an intercepts (plus σu
2, 
σv
2, and ρ in the heterogeneous model) only model and L1 is the full model. Table 5:  Estimation Results for the Number of Firms from Standard Count Models—Specification B 
(ADA-Specific Variables) 
  Poisson  Poisson   Fixed Effects 
   Regression 1  Regression 2  Poisson Regression 
   estimate
  s.e. 
  estimate
 
  s.e.    estimate
   
  s.e. 
  Difference estimates          
  % adults disabled, 1993-94  -0.067**  (0.025) -0.067**  (0.018)    -0.047**  (0.017)
  % adults disabled, 1995-97  -0.057  (0.030) -0.052*  (0.023)    -0.039  (0.020)
  EEOC charge rate, 1993-94  -0.057**  (0.009) -0.017**       
     
      
      
           
           
   
   
           
            
         
        
     




  EEOC charge rate, 1995-97  -0.042**  (0.007) -0.014** (0.004) -0.006 (0.004)
  Title III case rate, 1993-1994  -0.006  (0.032) 0.017* (0.007) 0.011 (0.014)
  Title III case rate, 1995-1997  0.002  (0.010) 0.003 (0.004) -0.000 (0.004)
 
Difference-in-difference estimates 
  Strong FEP state, 1993-94  0.016*  (0.008) 0.028**  (0.008)  0.023**
 
  (0.007)
  Strong FEP state, 1995-97  0.014  (0.012)   0.025* (0.011)   0.015 (0.010)
   
Main effects (apply to all years)   
  % adults disabled  0.154**  (0.046)   0.059**  (0.016)    0.030*  (0.014)
   FEP  state  0.052** (0.019) -0.131 (0.079)  n.a.
 State  dummies  no yes
 
n.a.
   
Log likelihood  -128,133     -119,793    -70,087 
Pseudo R
 2 0.943 0.947 0.969
* = 5% significance level; ** = 1% significance level.   
Notes:  Dependent variable is total number of food stores (SIC 5400) in county in year.  N = 30,578 in all estimations. Each standard 
error (s.e.) is robust to clustering within each county; s.e.’s for the fixed effects regression are calculated via bootstrap with 400 
repetitions.  All estimations include all controls from Specification A (Table 3), including year dummies.  All Difference estimates are 
differences from the pre-ADA period.  The fixed effects regression is estimated by conditional MLE and exploits variation within each 
county only to identify the coefficients. Table 6:  Estimation Results for Entry and Exit from CMt/CMt/∞ Model—
Specification B (ADA-Specific Variables) 
 No  Heterogeneity  Heterogeneity 
   estimate
  s.e.  estimate
  s.e. 
Entry rate parameters 
        
Difference estimates 
        
  % adults disabled, 1993-94  -0.692**  (0.066)    -0.357**  (0.106) 
  % adults disabled, 1995-97  -0.076  (0.073)    -0.046  (0.092) 
  EEOC charge rate, 1993-94  -0.331**  (0.013)    -0.089**  (0.020) 
  EEOC charge rate, 1995-97  -0.040**  (0.010)    -0.017  (0.014) 
  Title III case rate, 1993-1994  -0.084* (0.036)    -0.062 (0.068) 
  Title III case rate, 1995-1997  0.134** (0.021)   0.114** (0.032) 
              
Difference-in-difference estimates              
  Strong FEP state, 1993-94  -0.101** (0.031)   -0.056  (0.049) 
  Strong FEP state, 1995-97  -0.043 (0.026)    -0.071  (0.038) 
              
Main effects (apply to all years)              
  % adults disabled  0.154**  (0.043)    0.125*  (0.055) 
  Strong FEP state  -0.002  (0.020)    0.006  (0.025) 
              
Failure rate parameters              
Difference estimates              
  % adults disabled, 1993-94  -0.489**  (0.059)    -0.462**  (0.088) 
  % adults disabled, 1995-97  -0.151*  (0.068)    -0.212**  (0.082) 
  EEOC charge rate, 1993-94  -0.528**  (0.013)    -0.476**  (0.017) 
  EEOC charge rate, 1995-97  -0.022*  (0.009)    -0.001  (0.012) 
  Title III case rate, 1993-1994  0.013 (0.046)    -0.125 (0.115) 
  Title III case rate, 1995-1997  0.131** (0.018)   0.140** (0.026) 
              
Difference-in-difference estimates              
  Strong FEP state, 1993-94  -0.163** (0.028)   -0.100**  (0.037) 
  Strong FEP state, 1995-97  -0.017 (0.024)    0.031  (0.034) 
              
Main effects (apply to all years)              
  % adults disabled  0.035  (0.042)    0.121*  (0.051) 
  Strong FEP state  -0.032  (0.019)    -0.046*  (0.023) 
 
      
Includes Controls from Model A  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R
 2 0.451 0.073 
Log likelihood  -77077.1   -73,548.5 
 
* = 5% significance; ** = 1% significance.  N = 30,578.  Dependent variable:  total number of food 
stores (SIC 5400) in county in year.  The excluded period dummy is the pre-ADA period 1988-
1992.  Specification also includes all variables in specification A, previous table. Table 7:  Estimation Results for the Number of Firms from Standard Count Models—Specification C 
(ADA-Specific Variables, Differenced over Firm Sizes) 
 
  Poisson  Poisson   Fixed Effects 
   Regression 1  Regression 2  Poisson Regression   
   estimate
  s.e.    estimate
 
  s.e.    estimate
  
  s.e. 
Small firms differenced off large firms           




     
       
       
 
 
         
 
 
       
   
  % adults disabled, 1993-94  -0.079  (0.050)   -0.125**  (0.033)    -0.123** (0.030)
  % adults disabled, 1995-97  -0.180**  (0.052)   -0.158**  (0.039)    -0.163** (0.037)
  EEOC charge rate, 1993-94  -0.062**  (0.015) -0.019**  (0.006)    -0.014**
 
(0.005)
  EEOC charge rate, 1995-97  -0.027*  (0.012) -0.010  (0.007)    -0.004 (0.006)
  Title III case rate, 1993-94  0.029 (0.168) 0.030 (0.027)    0.020 (0.020)
  Title III case rate, 1995-97  0.009 (0.015) -0.017* (0.007)
 
  -0.018** (0.007)
Difference-in-difference-in-differences    
  Strong FEP state, 1993-94  0.022  (0.016) 0.029  (0.016)    0.029* (0.013)
  Strong FEP state, 1995-97  0.034  (0.021)
  
0.044*  (0.021)    0.040* (0.018)
Medium firms differenced off large 
firms 
 
  EEOC charge rate, 1993-94  -0.083**  (0.020) -0.018  (0.011)    -0.016 (0.013)
  EEOC charge rate, 1995-97 
 
-0.041**  (0.015) -0.025**  (0.008) 
 
  -0.022** (0.010)
State  dummies no yes   n.a.
* = 5% significance level; ** = 1% significance level.   
Notes:  N = 30,578 in each estimation, using SIC 54 data.  Estimates are differences across sizes of firms (as noted in first column) in 
differences over time (as noted in row headings; compared to the pre-ADA period).  For each specification there are three separate 
underlying estimations (one for each of small, medium, and large firms).  All variables from Specification B are included in each 
estimation; only the estimates of interest are reported in the table. Each standard error (s.e.) is robust to clustering within each county, 
and is calculated via bootstrap with 400 repetitions to account for covariance between coefficients to be differenced.   
 Table 8:  Estimation Results for Entry and Exit from CMt/CMt/∞ Model—
Specification C (ADA-Specific Variables, Differenced over Firm Sizes) 
 
 No  Heterogeneity  Heterogeneity 
   estimate
  s.e.  estimate
  s.e. 
Small firms differenced off large firms 
        
Entry rate parameters 
        
Difference-in-difference estimates          
  % adults disabled, 1993-94  -0.999**  (0.171)   -0.643  **  (0.205) 
  % adults disabled, 1995-97  -0.023  (0.162)   0.001    (0.185) 
  EEOC charge rate, 1993-94  -0.234**  (0.033)   -0.020    (0.038) 
  EEOC charge rate, 1995-97  0.009  (0.024)   0.024    (0.027) 
  Title III case rate, 1993-94  -0.460* (0.193)   -0.301    (0.213) 
  Title III case rate, 1995-97  0.059 (0.048)   0.046   (0.057) 
Difference-in-difference-in-differences              
  Strong FEP state, 1993-94  -0.203** (0.075)   -0.153    (0.090) 
  Strong FEP state, 1995-97  0.056  (0.065)   0.016    (0.076) 
Failure rate parameters             
Difference-in-difference estimates             
  % adults disabled, 1993-94  -0.838**  (0.181)   -0.784  **  (0.212) 
  % adults disabled, 1995-97  -0.270  (0.163)   -0.338    (0.186) 
  EEOC charge rate, 1993-94  -0.370**  (0.034)   -0.318  **  (0.040) 
  EEOC charge rate, 1995-97  0.002  (0.027)   0.008    (0.031) 
  Title III case rate, 1993-94  -0.390* (0.193)   -0.322    (0.232) 
  Title III case rate, 1995-97  0.022 (0.051)   0.034   (0.060) 
Difference-in-difference-in-differences              
  Strong FEP state, 1993-94  -0.372** (0.078)   -0.337  **  (0.091) 
  Strong FEP state, 1995-97  0.064  (0.069)   0.081    (0.081) 
Medium firms differenced off large 
firms             
Entry rate parameters 
        
  EEOC charge rate, 1993-94  0.049  (0.037)   0.068    (0.039) 
  EEOC charge rate, 1995-97  0.028  (0.029)   0.032    (0.030) 
Failure rate parameters             
  EEOC charge rate, 1993-94  0.088*  (0.039)   0.123  **  (0.045) 
  EEOC charge rate, 1995-97  0.086**  (0.031)   0.071  *  (0.034) 
 
* = 5% significance; ** = 1% significance.  N = 30,578.  Dependent variable:  total number of food 
stores (SIC 5400) in county in year.  The excluded period dummy is the pre-ADA period 1988-
1992.  Specification also includes all variables in specification A, Table 5. Table 9: Effect of the ADA on the Number, Entry, and Exit of Food Stores (Based on Specification C) 
 
   
           
Direct Estimates from Standard Count 










Regression No  Heterogeneity Heterogeneity
        
∆(Number 
of Firms)   
∆(Number 
of Firms)  
∆(Number 
of Firms)     ∆Entry    ∆ Exit 
Implied 
∆((Number 




Initial ADA Period:  1993-1994                         
  Small Firms 
 
-1,578   -2,259   -1,928    
           
   
         
 
           
1,600 3,057 -1,457  486 1,141 -655
  % ∆ in small firms  -1.1%   -1.5%   -1.3%   17.1%  21.5% -1.0%   5.2% 8.0% -0.4%
  Medium Firms 
 
-1,066   -343   -352   62  410 -348   161 554 -393
  % ∆ in medium firms 
 
-7.1%   -2.3%   -2.3%   1.7%  9.1% -2.3%   4.4% 12.3% -2.6%
  Total -2,644 -2,601 -2,279   1,662  3,467  -1,804   647 1,695 -1,048
  %∆ in small & medium firms  -1.6% 
 
  -1.6% 
 
  -1.4% 
 
  12.8% 










  Later ADA Period: 1995-1997 
    Small  Firms
 
-1,623 -2,659 -2,053 2,130 1,996 134 763 504 259
  % ∆ in small firms  -1.1%   -1.8%   -1.4%   20.3%  15.2% 0.1%   7.3% 3.8% 0.2%
  Medium Firms 
 
-949   -1,025   -922   -48  350 -399   30 319 -289
% ∆ in medium firms 
 
-6.5%   -7.0%   -6.3%   -1.1%  7.5% -2.7%   0.7% 6.8% -2.0%
  Total -2,572 -3,684 -2,975   2,082  2,346  -264   793 823 -30
  %∆ in small & medium firms  -1.6%    -2.3%    -1.9%    14.1%  13.2% -0.2%    5.4% 4.6% -0.02% 
 
Notes:  All figures are difference-in-difference estimates (net of trends for large firms) and are relative to a counterfactual “no ADA” regime.  For 
the small firms, in the counterfactual Title III case rate is set to zero and Strong FEP state for the ADA periods is set to one.  For the medium firms, 
in the counterfactual Title III case rate and EEOC charge rate are set to zero and Strong FEP state for the ADA periods is set to one.  ∆(Number of 
Firms) for the direct estimates is based on coefficients from the estimations from Table 7.  ∆Entry is calculated as the difference in   [equation (9 
CHECK THIS)] and ∆Exit as the difference in 
λ ˆ
µ ˆ 1 − t N  [equation (10 CHECK THIS)] relative to the counterfactual, based on coefficients from the 
estimations from Table 8.  Implied ∆(Number of Firms) is calculated as ∆Entry minus ∆Exit.  All figures are calculated at the county level and 
aggregated to the national level.     
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